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Abstract This study analyzes the spillover effect of the spatial
concentration of subprime lending on the performance of
recently originated community reinvestment mortgages targeting
low- to moderate-income borrowers. The level of subprime
lending in a census tract is found to be a signiﬁcant predictor of
the default and prepayment probability of the community
reinvestment loans in the same neighborhoods. The results
suggest that the concentration of subprime lending and the
resulting clusters of foreclosed properties reduce neighborhood
property values and increase price volatility. The lowered
property values and the increased volatility increase the default
probability of borrowers holding any loan product, including
community reinvestment mortgages. This study provides new
evidence concerning the negative impacts of the concentration
of subprime lending in certain neighborhoods.
There have been an unprecedented number of defaults by subprime mortgages,
with even more subprime foreclosures likely.1 However, the issues around how to
keep borrowers in their homes affect all market segments, not just subprime loans.
One major concern is the spillover effect from the subprime crisis where the
subprime foreclosures are usually concentrated in certain markets and
neighborhoods (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter, 2004). Because of the concentration
of subprime mortgage loans in certain areas, there is a potential for negative
externalities from the subprime lending because of the reduced access to prime
lending, concentration of foreclosures, and the resulting reduced property values.
In fact, the performance of other mortgage products, such as FHA loans and some
prime loan products, has become worse, as indicated by recent evidence of sharp
increases in delinquencies and foreclosures.2 What caused the defaults of other
mortgage products, especially the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) loans
serving low- and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers during the housing crisis? In
particular, what is the spillover effect of the meltdown of the subprime market on
the default risk of CRA-type loan products, especially considering the
concentration of subprime loans in particular places?342  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
Research has identiﬁed that subprime loans typically have higher delinquency and
default rates (Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen, 2007). Immergluck (2008) indicates
that subprime loans foreclose at rates 10 to 20 times the rate of prime loans, when
different measures of foreclosures and different deﬁnitions of subprime loans are
used. Research has also documented some evidence of the negative effects of
foreclosures on property values, the community, the municipal government, and
the local economy (Apgar, Duda, and Gorey, 2005; Pennington-Cross and Ho,
2006a; Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Shlay and Whitman, 2006; Lin, Rosenblatt,
and Yao, 2008). However, the interplay between the concentration of subprime
lending and the performance of other loan products in a neighborhood has received
little attention. Only a few studies have investigated the impact of certain
neighborhood characteristics on the performance of residential mortgages, but the
impact of subprime lending in a neighborhood has not been considered (e.g.,
Cotterman, 2001). This is in part because subprime lending has grown signiﬁcantly
only since the early 2000s and the meltdown of the subprime market happened
very recently.
To ﬁll the gap in the literature, this study focuses on the relationship between the
concentration of subprime lending and the performance of a sample of CRA-type
mortgages serving low- and moderate-income borrowers in the same
neighborhoods. Instead of using data at the aggregate level, this study uses micro-
data to analyze how subprime lending impacts the performance of a sample of
CRA-type mortgage within the same neighborhood. The particular dataset comes
from the Community Advantage Program (CAP) developed by a nonproﬁt
community development ﬁnancial institution, Self-Help Ventures Fund (Self-
Help), in partnership with a group of lenders, Fannie Mae, and the Ford
Foundation (Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe, 2008). Though borrowers in this
program usually have greater credit risk than traditional prime borrowers, the vast
majority of loans originated under this program features terms associated with the
prime market: 30-year ﬁxed-rate amortizing loans with prime-level interest rates,
no prepayment penalties, no balloons, escrows for taxes and insurance,
documented income, and standard prime-level fees. CAP borrowers are LMI
homebuyers, with high shares of minority households, households headed by
single females, and ﬁrst-time homebuyers. This program reﬂects a number of
affordable lending programs stimulated by CRA, which target LMI and minority
borrowers across the country.
This study examined a sample of CAP loans originated from 2001 to 2006 for
their performance during the January 2004 through March 2008 period. The
ﬁndings reveal that the level of subprime activities, measured by the share of
subprime originations in a census tract, is a signiﬁcant predictor of the
performance of this sample of CRA-type loans. A higher level of subprime lending
in a neighborhood increases the probability of delinquency and default for
borrowers holding affordable mortgages in the same neighborhoods. Other things
equal, the predicted conditional probability of default for an affordable loan in a
tract with a high level of subprime lending (assumed 50% in 2005) would be overNeighborhood Subprime Lending  343
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34% higher than that for a loan with similar characteristics but in a tract with the
national average level of subprime activities. There is also some evidence that the
prepayment probability would be lower for borrowers living in neighborhoods
with a higher level of subprime reﬁnance lending. A two-stage probit least squares
(2SPLS) analysis shows that a higher level of subprime activities causes a decline
in neighborhood property values and increases the price volatility. Because of the
declined property value, the default risk of CAP loans in the same neighborhoods
increases signiﬁcantly. Overall, this study provides new evidence concerning the
negative impacts of the concentration of subprime lending in certain
neighborhoods, and offers some insight into the possible mechanisms through
which the concentration of subprime lending impacts the default risk of other loan
products.
The next section reviews recent literature on residential mortgage default studies,
especially the default risk of prime and subprime borrowers and the spillover effect
of foreclosures on the neighborhood and community. The third section describes




There has been extensive literature on residential mortgage foreclosure since the
1960s. Borrowers’ options usually include the choices of losing the home
(foreclosure,o rput option), paying off the mortgage (prepayment,o rcall option),
and remaining active (Deng, Quigley, and Van Order, 2000). The main driver of
whether the borrower exercises the put option is negative equity in the property,
but usually a trigger, such as a sudden drop or loss of income or increase in
expenses, is also required (Vandell, 1995). If there is sufﬁcient equity in the home,
a trigger event is usually insufﬁcient to cause default severe enough to lead to
foreclosure, because borrowers can simply sell the property or reﬁnance it when
they experience negative trigger events. In addition, some environmental factors,
such as local economic conditions and changes in underwriting standards, also
inﬂuence borrowers’ decision to default (Cutts and Merrill, 2008). A downturn in
the local economy will slow home sales, depress prices, and increase
unemployment, thus increasing the default risk relative to stronger economic
conditions.
Default Risk of Subprime Mortgages
In general, research has documented that subprime loans typically have higher
delinquency and default rates than prime loans and government-insured products
(Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen, 2007). As summarized by Immergluck (2008),344  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
subprime loans of all types generally foreclose at rates over 10 times that of prime
loans. The high default rate reﬂects the high-risk characteristics of subprime
borrowers, such as impaired borrower credit scores, lower levels of household
income and assets,3 or other attributes that increase the credit risk to lenders. More
important, some features and loan terms prevalent in subprime products are
associated with higher default risk. For example, loans with prepayment penalties
and balloon payments, which are common among subprime products, are found
to have higher default risk (Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2005; Quercia, Stegman,
and Davis, 2007). Another feature common among subprime loans but not so
among prime loans is the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), which periodically
adjusts the interest rate on the note based on a variety of indices. There is some
evidence that subprime ARMs have a higher risk of foreclosure likely because of
the interest-rate risk they carry (Calhoun and Deng, 2002). At the aggregate level,
the share of ARMs appears to be positively associated with market risk as
measured by the probability of a property declining within two years (Immergluck,
2008). Hybrid ARMs, which have ﬁxed rates for the ﬁrst few years before the
mortgage converts to annual ARMs and usually also carry a prepayment penalty,
have been found to bear a particularly high risk of default when the interest rate
resets (Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Huszar, 2005; Pennington-Cross and Ho,
2006b). A recent paper provides evidence that much of the poor performance of
subprime loans can be attributed to mortgage types not borrower types (Ding,
Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe, 2008).
Foreclosure studies at the market or neighborhood level have also found a strong
association between foreclosure and subprime lending shares. In their analysis of
tract-level foreclosure levels in Chicago, Immergluck and Smith (2004) ﬁnd that
the best predictor of future foreclosure levels was the number of subprime loans
originated over the previous ﬁve years. Mian and Suﬁ (2008) show that places
with high mortgage rejection rates in the mid-1990s had higher than average price
increases in the ﬁrst half of this decade because the development of the nonprime4
sector enabled those who were previously shut out of the housing market to
purchase a home. This suggests that the rapid development of nonprime loans
because of looser underwriting was an important factor in the price bubble and
the subsequent high foreclosure rate. Immergluck (2008) indicates that recent
changes in mortgage markets have resulted in spatially concentrated patterns of
foreclosures, particularly in neighborhoods where high-risk products—subprime
mortgages, exotic mortgages (such as interest-only, payment-option loans, negative
amortization loans, piggy-back loans, and Alt-A loans), and zero-down-payment
mortgages—are more prevalent.
However, until very recently, subprime loans were a much smaller part of the
overall market and consequently their inﬂuence on overall loan performance was
negligible. For many years, the subprime sector focused on serving credit-
blemished borrowers in need of reﬁnancing and was a minor part of the overall
mortgage market. When subprime loans ﬁrst hit a peak in serious delinquency
rates in 2003, they constituted only 4% of the outstanding loans (Cutts and Merrill,Neighborhood Subprime Lending  345
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2008). The sizable activity in subprime lending in more recent years should have
a greater inﬂuence in the mortgage market. The volume of subprime lending
peaked in 2005, representing about 20% of the dollars of all new loans originated
that year. In 2007, however, the subprime market dropped sharply, to less than
8% of all loan dollars (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2008). As of the fourth quarter
of 2007, subprime loans constituted about one eighth of all outstanding loans but
54% of the foreclosures started that quarter (Mortgage Bankers Association,
2008).
Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood
Property Values
While the causal relationship between home prices and foreclosures may be two-
directional, there is strong evidence of the negative effects of foreclosures on
property values. Forgey, Rutherford, and VanBuskirk (1994) and Hardin and
Wolverton (1996) ﬁnd that foreclosures are usually sold at a discount of price
(about 23%) because of moral risk, deteriorated housing conditions, and other
negative features associated with foreclosure. Similarly, Pennington-Cross and Ho
(2006a) ﬁnd that foreclosed property appreciates on average 22% less than the
area average appreciation rate.
Foreclosures, particularly in lower-income neighborhoods, may lead to lower
property values because of abandoned foreclosed properties and the resulting
physical disorder and even crime in the community. One related study, focusing
on the impact of delinquency on property values by Simons, Quercia, and Maric
(1998), suggests that average sales prices of a given residence fell by $788 per
1% increase in tax delinquencies within a one-to-two block area of a residence.
Immergluck and Smith (2006) ﬁnd that foreclosures of conventional single-family
(one- to four-unit) loans have a signiﬁcant impact on nearby property values. They
estimate that each conventional foreclosure within an eighth of a mile of a single-
family home results in a decline of 0.9% in property value, and may be as high
as 1.5% in low- to moderate-income communities. Shlay and Whitman’s (2006)
study on housing values in Philadelphia ﬁnds that an abandoned property lowered
values on homes within a 150-foot radius by an average of 10% and lowered
values on homes within a 450-foot radius by an average of 5%. A recent study
based on a 2006 sample in Chicago shows that one foreclosure may lower the
value of neighboring properties by as much as 8.7% and that the negative spillover
effect on neighboring properties is signiﬁcant within 0.9 km (about 10 blocks) of
the property and within ﬁve years from the liquidation (Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao,
2009).
In many markets, large numbers of foreclosed properties or properties in the
foreclosure process depress the price of all homes and increase the time it takes
to dispose of any one property. As of late 2007, in some parts of California, nearly
50% of home sales were foreclosed houses, and the share of foreclosed properties
in Nevada, Colorado, Tennessee, and Michigan ranged from 9.3% in Tennessee346  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
to 17.5% in Nevada (Zibel, 2008). Faced with the high costs of holding properties,
sellers of foreclosed homes are cutting prices rather than holding their property
for any extended time. As more foreclosed homes go on sale at prices usually
lower than market values, both the competition and the sale time increases for all
sellers.
Broader Spillover Effect from Concentrated Foreclosures
The concentration of foreclosures imposes signiﬁcant costs not only on individual
borrowers and properties, but also on communities, municipal governments, and
the local economy. Based on operational data from local agencies that handled
foreclosures, an early study by Moreno (1995) estimates that a foreclosure, on
average, costs the study city $27,000 and the neighborhood $10,000. Apgar, Duda,
and Gorey (2005, p. 2) ﬁnd within one single block in the Auburn/Gresham
neighborhood of Chicago that ‘‘accounting for both the foreclosure costs paid for
by City and County agencies, and the impact of foreclosure on area property
values, a foreclosure on this block could impose direct costs on local government
agencies totaling more than $34,000 and indirect effects on nearby property
owners (in the form of reduced property values and home equity) of as much as
an additional $220,000.’’
Ultimately, the spillover effects of concentrated foreclosures will likely impact the
economic and social wellbeing of a community, as rising foreclosures and falling
house prices can easily squelch economic activities. The possible consequences
may include lower consumption and production, increased unemployment, and
ultimately recession, and may eventually inﬂuence the behavior of borrowers
holding outstanding mortgages. As a result, the economic conditions of
neighboring homeowners may also be negatively impacted, which could adversely
affect their ability to make mortgage payments—another possible impact of the
concentration of subprime lending on the performance of other loan products.
In addition, the concentration of subprime lending in certain neighborhoods
reﬂects the lack of access to prime lending in these neighborhoods. Borrowers in
riskier markets dominated by subprime lenders undoubtedly would ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to reﬁnance existing mortgages through the prime market. Immergluck and Wiles
(1999) provide evidence that the failure of prime lenders to seek out credit-worthy
borrowers in lower-income and minority communities leaves those communities
vulnerable to subprime lenders.
Overall, the literature review conﬁrms that subprime loans generally carry higher
default risk and that the proportion of subprime lending in an area is the best
predictor of future foreclosure levels. A concentration of subprime lending would
result in more foreclosures in certain neighborhoods, which very likely leads to
reduced values of neighboring properties. If the current value of their property
falls below their outstanding loan balance (i.e., their home equity is zero or less),
mortgagors are much more likely to default on their loans, no matter what kindNeighborhood Subprime Lending  347
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of mortgage products they hold. So the literature suggests that a concentration of
subprime loans in a neighborhood greatly impacts the overall performance of all
outstanding mortgages. This study links the level of subprime lending to the
performance of a sample of CRA-type loans.
 Data and Methodology
Data
Data for this study comes primarily from a subset of home purchase loans
originated by a group of lenders under the Self-Help Ventures Fund’s Community
Advantage Program (CAP). Stimulated by the Community Reinvestment Act, CAP
loans were originated under lender-crafted affordable mortgage programs. These
programs feature customized loan guidelines tailored to meet lenders’ CRA goals,
as well as local market needs. Many of these loans are held in lenders’ portfolios
because most of them meet neither the underwriting guidelines used by secondary
mortgage market institutions nor the underwriting guidelines for FHA loans.
However, under the CAP program, participating lenders are able to sell these
nonconforming mortgages to Self-Help, which then securitizes and sells them to
Fannie Mae or other investors. Participating lenders originate and service the loans
under contract with Self-Help. It should be emphasized that, while many of the
borrowers are somewhat credit impaired, the program cannot be characterized as
subprime. The CAP portfolio, which is made up of retail (i.e., not broker)
originations, features loans with prime terms and conditions, such as no
prepayment penalties and no balloons.
A subset of 17,080 CAP loans originated from 2001 to 2006 was used in this
analysis (Exhibit 1). Loans that had a delinquency or were terminated (either
foreclosed or prepaid) before 2004 were dropped from the sample. In other words,
for loans originated before 2004, only those that were still active and had not
experienced a delinquency before 2004 were included in the sample. All the loans
in this sample are home purchase loans with ﬁxed interest rates, without
prepayment penalties or balloons; over 98% of them have a 30-year amortization
period. Loans in this sample are characterized by high original loan-to-value
(LTV) ratios: over 79% of loans have an original LTV of 95% or higher, and with
over 73% at 97% LTV or higher. This sample of borrowers also has relatively
low credit scores (average score of 680) and low household income (mean
household income at origination of about $35,700). The mean back-end ratio—
that portion of a person’s monthly income that goes toward debt—was 36%.
About 39% of borrowers are minorities, including are African Americans (14.4%)
and Hispanics (14.7%). National in scope, this sample of 17,080 CAP loans were
originated in 44 states and 8,108 census tracts (Exhibit 2). As Exhibit 2 shows,
most tracts (62%) have only one CAP loan; less than 9% of tracts have ﬁve or
more CAP loans. Because the number of CAP loans in each tract is very small,348  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics of Origination Information for CAP Loans
Variable Percent Mean
Credit Score
No Credit Score or missing 3.6%
















Income at Origination $34,589
Neighborhood Characteristics
Tract MI 80% AMI 30.0%
Tract MI 80–100% AMI 30.2%
Tract MI 100–120% AMI 22.9%




















Total 17,080Neighborhood Subprime Lending  349
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Exhibit 1  (continued)
Descriptive Statistics of Origination Information for CAP Loans
Note: Originated between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2006. Loans that had
experienced delinquency or terminated before January 2004 were not included; a few loans with
adjusted rates and a number of other loans with missing data were dropped.
Exhibit 2  Number of Loans in Census Tract







Note: The total number of loans is 17,080.
it is safe to assume the performance of CAP loans will not signiﬁcantly impact
the neighborhood.
This study focuses on the impact of subprime activities in recent years and the
study period is from January 2004 to March 2008. It is generally accepted that
recent subprime vintages are riskier than earlier ones: subprime loans that
originated in 2005 and 2006, especially subprime ARMs, have performed the
worst because of a relaxed underwriting criteria to credit score, lax documentation
and veriﬁcation of income, higher combined loan-to-value ratios, and the
popularity of risky loan terms (Bernanke, 2008). So a concentration of 2005–2006
subprime originations would seem to have greater negative externalities.
In addition, beginning in late 2006, economic conditions signiﬁcantly worsened,
with a sharp deceleration—and outright decline in some markets—of house
prices, rising interest rates, and in more recent years a weakening economy. All
these factors impacted the underwriting and performance of different mortgage
products.
Further, sizable subprime lending activities after 2004 at the neighborhood level
allow a meaningful analysis. After being a minor part of the overall mortgage350  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
market for many years, the subprime share of all mortgage originations by volume
peaked in 2005. That year subprime loans made up over 20% of the dollars of all
mortgages originated (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2008). While the subprime share
of reﬁnance loans decreased and ﬂowed with interest rate ﬂuctuations, the
subprime share of purchase loans grew steadily through 2006 (Immergluck, 2008).
The level of subprime lending in 2005–2006 is hypothesized to have greater
impact on communities because of its relatively larger market share.
HMDA data were used to construct different measures of subprime lending at the
census tract level, including the share of subprime purchase loans and the share
of subprime reﬁnance loans in census tracts. The term subprime in this analysis
refers to those rate-reported ‘‘higher-price’’ loans in HMDA. Subprime purchase
and reﬁnance loans have different risk characteristics and this study tests the
possible differences empirically. Because changes in the shape of the yield curve
can affect the proportion of loans reported as higher priced in a given year,
different measures based on both 2005 and 2006 HMDA data were examined.
As suggested in Mian and Suﬁ (2008), the subprime share may pick up the loose
underwriting in certain neighborhoods if the impact of recent subprime
originations on the performance of CAP loans originated in the same period is
examined. To test the robustness of the results, the sample was divided into two
cohorts, with one focusing on 2001–2003 originations and the other on 2004–
2006 originations. Using two cohorts supports the analysis of whether
neighborhood subprime lending impacts only loans originated in the softening
market or those seasoned loans as well.
Methodology
Payment history data are used to identify when a loan was delinquent, foreclosed,
or prepaid. This study follows the option theory, and views mortgage borrowers
as having three options in each month:
 Default: Different measures of default (90-day delinquency or
foreclosure/returned loans5) are used in different models.
 Prepaid: If a loan was prepaid before it defaults, it is considered a
prepayment.
 Active: Active and not default (not seriously delinquent in some models).
A multinomial logit (MNL) is used to model outcomes with multiple possible
states. In each month the loan can be in only one state or outcome (active,
delinquent, or prepaid). Since the sum of the probabilities of each outcome must
equal one, the increase in the probability of one outcome necessitates a decrease
in the probability of at least one competing outcome. Thus the multinomial logit
model is a competing risk model. The probability of observing a particular loan
outcome is given by:Neighborhood Subprime Lending  351
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where j  0,1,2 represents the three possible outcomes of a loan and the omitted
category (j  0) is remaining active and not delinquent (ACTIVE). dijt is an
indicator variable taking on the value 1 if outcome j occurs to loan i at time t,
and zero otherwise. Z contains a set of explanatory variables and  is the
coefﬁcient. S contains the measures of the level of subprime lending in the
neighborhood. To control for the potential statistical problems associated with
repeated events, the model is estimated using Stata’s mlogit procedure with an
adjustment to the standard errors for clustering by loan.
Many factors besides subprime lending inﬂuence the performance of residential
mortgages. Based on the literature, following variables are controlled in the MNL
model (Exhibit 5 provides summary statistics):
 Value of the Put Option (put): According to the option-based theory,
home equity plays a central role in determining the probability of
foreclosure. The value of the put option of a loan for each month is
calculated using the unpaid mortgage balance, and the estimated house
price is calculated using the house price index (HPI) of the Ofﬁce of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).6 The value of the put
option indicates the ratio of negative equity (unpaid balance minus
estimated house price) to the original house price.
 Value of the Call Option (call): To determine whether the call option
is ‘‘in the money,’’ the present discounted value of the current mortgage
is compared with the present discounted value of a prevailing market-
rate mortgage.7 Falling interest rates will lead to faster prepayments and
drive down delinquency rates as borrowers reﬁnance their way out of
potential problems. Rising interest rates cause payment shocks at the
reset date for adjustable-rate mortgages and reduce the ability of
borrowers to afford a ﬁxed-rate reﬁnance. Saving from reﬁnancing is
reported as a ratio, which indicates the fraction of saving by considering
a reﬁnancing mortgage with the prevailing market rate.
 Credit History: Borrower credit scores at origination are controlled, and
lower FICO scores are assumed to be associated with higher credit risk.352  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
 Debt-to-Income Ratio (DTI): DTI variables are controlled in the model,
and higher DTIs are also assumed to be associated with higher credit
risk.
 Loan Size (lupb): Loan size is measured by the amount of unpaid balance
in the log.
 Loan Age (loanage): Since some early studies indicate that the
relationship between loan age and default is not linear, this variable is
measured by the log value of the number of months after origination.
 Borrower Race: As suggested in the literature, African-American
borrowers may have higher default rates on conventional residential
mortgages than other borrowers, so dummy variables are included to
identify African-American borrowers and Hispanic borrowers.
 Neighborhood Controls: The following neighborhood controls are
included to capture neighborhood demographic and economic
characteristics include: the share of African Americans in a census tract
and census tract median income relative to area median income. All the
tract-level variables are from the 2000 Census and represent a single
point-in-time snapshot of the tract.
 Area Economic Indicators: The monthly unemployment rates at the
county level from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are controlled.
 Time Dummies: Dummies of 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005 originations
are considered in different models
Causality Issue
The MNL model is able to test the association between neighborhood subprime
lending and the performance of CAP loans. However, the actual transmission
mechanisms through which subprime activities inﬂuence the CAP loan
performance still need to be identiﬁed. Since subprime activities seem to inﬂuence
the CAP loan performance indirectly, failure to address this problem will result
in biased and inconsistent estimates. As suggested in the literature, the hypothesis
in this study is that subprime lending negatively inﬂuences neighborhood property
values: a higher level of subprime activities and the resulting high default rates
will lead to deterioration in the property values of the neighborhood. Due to the
declined property values, the delinquency and foreclosure risk of borrowers in
these neighborhoods holding any type of mortgages, including CAP loans, will
increase signiﬁcantly. For simplicity, the study focuses on the default behavior of
the sample of CAP loans originated during 2004–2006 in the period from
origination to the ﬁrst quarter of 2008 so there is a cross-sectional dataset.
To control for this endogenous relationship of neighborhood house price dynamics
and CAP borrower default behavior, this study employs a simultaneous equations
model with an endogenous continuous variable for neighborhood house price
appreciation and a endogenous binary variable for CAP loan default (y1  1f o rNeighborhood Subprime Lending  353
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90day delinquency or foreclosure after origination, 0 otherwise). The model is
characterized by the structural equations:
y*   y   X   X  u (2) 11 21 2 1 21 1 1 11
y   y   X   X  u (3) 21 11 2 1 22 2 2 22
Where is the binary variable for CAP loan default, X12 is a vector of exogenous y* 1
variables used in both equations, X11 and X22 are vectors of exogenous variables
used exclusively in (2) and (3), respectively. y2 represents neighborhood house
price changes and two different measures are tried: the absolute change and the
price volatility. The rational for the volatility variables is that consumers usually
do not observe home value in static terms and recent movement (trends and
volatility) matters as much as absolute changes. Borrower default is hypothesized
as a function of neighborhood house price change and the neighborhood house
price dynamics is a function of MSA house price change, neighborhood subprime
activities, and local economic conditions. Of course, the CAP default behavior is
hypothesized to further depress neighborhood house property values.
Both a continuous and a dichotomous variable are hypothesized to simultaneously
determine each other and this can be estimated by the two-stage probit least
squares (2SPLS), which has been discussed by Maddala (1983). The cdsimeq
command in STATA was used to obtain consistent estimates for the coefﬁcients,
as well as their corrected standard errors (Keshk, 2003).
In the ﬁrst stage of the analysis, the neighborhood housing price change is
regressed on MSA house price change, neighborhood subprime activities, local
economic conditions, and other explanatory variables in the model. It is assumed
that area house price change, subprime activities, and other neighborhood controls
are uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of the CAP loan default behavior
and that these instruments only inﬂuence the troublesome neighborhood house
price change, controlling for the other covariates.8
In the second stage of the analysis, the CAP loan default is regressed on the
predicted value of neighborhood house price change, as well as other controls of
individual borrower credit risk. The instruments, such as neighborhood subprime
activities, are not included as regressors in the second stage, assuming they do
not inﬂuence the default behavior directly.
It is difﬁcult to observe the house price change at the neighborhood level.
Fortunately, the neighborhood house price change can be proxied based on one
quarterly data series that relate to the valuation of the CAP portfolio provided by
Fannie Mae. The data comprises redrawn mark-to-market loan-to-value ratios
(MTMs) and property values can also be derived from the MTMs by means of
the last observed principal balance on each loan. The full series of data extend
from the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2008. Though Fannie Mae354  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
did not provide the details of the methodology, the MTM data has been used for
evaluating acquisitions, internal risk modeling, and fair value computations by
Fannie Mae. But the MTM property value data generally does not consider
property-speciﬁc characteristics.9 So although the MTM data are assumed to
provide house price information for individual properties, housing price changes
derived from the proprietary MTM data are assumed to be a better proxy of the
neighborhood housing price dynamics than that based on other house price
indexes. Unfortunately, the MTM data are not available for all CAP loans and
4,379 out of the 6,986 CAP loans originated during the 2004–2006 period are
used in this analysis. The absolute change and volatility (standard deviation of
house price changes) measures of neighborhood house price are constructed for
each loan during the period of the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2008.
For the default model, except for the endogenous house price change variable, the
important borrower and loan characteristics are controlled including borrower
credit score, LTV ratios, DTI ratios, race, and loan size. For the neighborhood
housing price change model, the level of subprime activities is measured by the
share of home purchase/reﬁnance subprime originations at the tract level.
Differences in underlying economic conditions across local markets have
important implications for both the level and changes of housing price. Local
economic conditions are measured by county unemployment rates and yearly
changes, as well as levels of per-capita income and its annual changes. The 2006
county unemployment data and the yearly changes in unemployment rate from
2004 through 2008 were collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Levels of
per-capita income in 2006 and yearly changes for 2005 and 2006 were taken from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.10 Higher unemployment or lower income
growth (or income declines) are hypothesized to be negatively associated with
house price appreciation.
 Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics suggest that loans in neighborhoods (tracts) with greater
subprime activities have higher delinquency rates and lower prepayment rates.
Exhibit 3 shows the worst delinquencies for the CAP loans in this study. More
than half (52%) were still active and had never experienced any delinquencies as
of March 2008. About 32% of borrowers prepaid their mortgages. A total of 20%
of the sample experienced different levels of delinquencies, and over 6.3% had at
least one 90day delinquency. Exhibit 4 shows a crosstab of 90-day delinquency
rates and the level of subprime lending in census tracts. The 90-day delinquency
rate for loans in tracts with extensive subprime purchase lending (with 50%
subprime purchase loans in 2005) is about 7%, about 1.5 times that of loans in
neighborhoods with less subprime purchase lending (15% subprime purchase
loans). When the level of subprime lending is measured by the share of subprime
reﬁnance loans in census tracts, this pattern is consistent and more obvious.
Exhibits 6–8 list the results of the multinomial logit models using different
dependent variables, different study samples, and different measures of subprimeNeighborhood Subprime Lending  355
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Exhibit 3  Loan Performance: Worse Delinquency From January 2004 to March 2008









Note: The percentages do not sum to 100 because some loans may experience a delinquency ﬁrst
and then prepay the loan.
Exhibit 4  CAP Loan Performance and Neighborhood Subprime Lending in 2005
Share of Subprime Lending
Delinquency
(90Days) Foreclosure # of Loans
Purchase 0%–14.9% 4.7% 1.4% 2,633
15%–19.9% 5.3% 2.2% 2,114
20%–29.9% 6.9% 2.7% 4,216
30%–49.9% 7.7% 2.8% 5,304
50% 7.0% 2.7% 2,813
Reﬁnance 0–14.9% 3.1% 0.7% 1,271
15–19.9% 3.7% 1.5% 1,505
20–29.9% 5.9% 2.0% 5,442
30–49.9% 7.5% 3.2% 7,095
50% 10.4% 3.3% 1,767
Note: Based on a sample of 17,080 CAP loans originated from 2001 to 2006 in 8,108 census
tracts. If a loan experienced 90-day delinquency ﬁrst and prepaid later, it was counted as a 90-
day delinquency only. The share of subprime lending is based on 2005 HMDA data.
lending at the neighborhood level. Model 1 to Model 4 in Exhibit 6 focus on the
impact of neighborhood subprime purchase activities on default and prepayment
of CAP loans, while Model 5 to Model 8 in Exhibit 7 focus on the impact of
subprime reﬁnancing activities on the performance of CAP loans. In Models 1, 3,
5, and 7, default is measured by 90-day delinquency, while in Models 2, 4, 6, and
8 default is measured by whether a loan ends up in foreclosure or is returned. The356  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe





Variable Mean Std. rr. Mean Std. rr. Description
reﬁ 5.358 6.833 3.931 6.841 Call option, saving from reﬁnancing in
the prime market (percentage)
put 29.201 18.917 11.887 11.843 Put option: (unpaid balance-house
price)/original price (percentage)
cred620 0.102 0.303 0.136 0.343 Borrower credit score less than 620
cred660 0.198 0.398 0.234 0.424 Borrower credit score 620–659
cred720 0.330 0.470 0.322 0.467 Borrower credit score 660–719
dti miss 0.072 0.259 0.065 0.247 Debt-to-income data missing
dti36 0.292 0.454 0.252 0.434 Debt-to-income ratio 28%–36%
dti42 0.284 0.451 0.296 0.456 Debt-to-income ratio 36%–42%
dti100 0.171 0.376 0.271 0.444 Debt-to-income ratio greater than 42%
af american 0.159 0.366 0.143 0.350 African-American borrower
hispanic 0.173 0.378 0.078 0.268 Hispanic borrower
lupb 11.237 0.472 11.395 0.445 Unpaid balance (in log)
loanage 3.636 0.516 2.730 0.812 Loan age in months (in log) from
origination
tra inc80 0.305 0.460 0.278 0.448 Tract median income less than 80%
AMI
tra inc120 0.529 0.499 0.548 0.498 Tract median income 80–120% AMI
tra black15 0.136 0.342 0.144 0.352 Af american resident share of 15%–
30% in tract
tra black30 0.212 0.408 0.179 0.383 Af american resident share greater
than 30% in tract
u rate 4.887 1.313 5.132 1.296 County unemployment rate
p sub 2005 0.325 0.172 0.301 0.162 Tract share of subprime purchase
lending in 2005
r sub 2005 0.325 0.137 0.360 0.131 Tract share of subprime reﬁnance
lending in 2005
y2001 0.325 0.468 Dummy for 2001 originations
y2002 0.349 0.477 Dummy for 2002 originations
y2004 0.506 0.500 Dummy for 2004 originations
y2005 0.318 0.466 Dummy for 2005 originations

























































Exhibit 6  MNL Regression Results of the Impact of Neighborhood Subprime Lending (Home Purchase in 2005)
2001–2003 Sample 2004–2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
90-day Foreclosure 90-day Foreclosure
Risk Variable Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Delinquent reﬁ 0.069 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.029 0.001 0.017 0.238
put 0.033 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.070 0.000
cred620 0.939 0.000 0.144 0.532 1.989 0.000 1.679 0.000
cred660 0.717 0.000 0.004 0.983 1.339 0.000 1.141 0.000
cred720 0.339 0.007 0.196 0.246 0.629 0.000 0.449 0.074
dti miss 1.193 0.000 1.762 0.000 0.444 0.081 0.470 0.319
dti36 0.444 0.004 0.477 0.041 0.375 0.023 0.434 0.142
dti42 0.402 0.010 0.264 0.271 0.351 0.033 0.385 0.194
dti100 0.272 0.131 0.204 0.467 0.517 0.002 0.683 0.019
af american 0.026 0.852 0.734 0.005 0.125 0.308 0.606 0.016
hispanic 0.227 0.085 0.275 0.132 0.193 0.202 0.296 0.211
lupb 0.479 0.000 0.517 0.005 0.227 0.020 0.043 0.821
loanage 1.284 0.000 2.233 0.000 0.972 0.000 1.599 0.000
tra inc80 0.100 0.558 0.009 0.972 0.125 0.437 0.426 0.144
tra inc120 0.050 0.727 0.057 0.783 0.208 0.124 0.608 0.019
tra black15 0.100 0.443 0.057 0.779 0.262 0.066 0.418 0.112
tra black30 0.057 0.681 0.239 0.238 0.178 0.185 0.011 0.964
u rate 0.097 0.021 0.160 0.015 0.073 0.037 0.046 0.472
p sub 2005 0.725 0.020 1.432 0.005 0.738 0.012 1.174 0.018
y2001(y2004) 1.440 0.000 2.045 0.000 0.617 0.000 0.211 0.375
y2002(y2005) 0.887 0.000 1.163 0.000 0.352 0.003 0.027 0.900





























Exhibit 6  (continued)
MNL Regression Results of the Impact of Neighborhood Subprime Lending (Home Purchase in 2005)
2001–2003 Sample 2004–2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
90-day Foreclosure 90-day Foreclosure
Risk Variable Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Prepayment reﬁ 0.055 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.052 0.000
put 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.022 0.000
cred620 0.183 0.004 0.185 0.003 0.152 0.193 0.178 0.118
cred660 0.124 0.006 0.133 0.003 0.038 0.661 0.041 0.630
cred720 0.106 0.006 0.108 0.005 0.004 0.961 0.008 0.914
dti miss 0.251 0.003 0.258 0.002 0.078 0.587 0.080 0.574
dti36 0.048 0.338 0.055 0.272 0.325 0.003 0.310 0.004
dti42 0.139 0.006 0.140 0.006 0.260 0.015 0.250 0.019
dti100 0.080 0.160 0.083 0.143 0.169 0.128 0.146 0.185
af american 0.482 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.516 0.000 0.512 0.000
hispanic 0.071 0.090 0.071 0.090 0.155 0.211 0.166 0.179
lupb 0.509 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.194 0.036 0.167 0.065
loanage 0.422 0.000 0.435 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.245 0.000
tra inc80 0.004 0.935 0.002 0.968 0.143 0.177 0.180 0.089
tra inc120 0.042 0.358 0.050 0.276 0.029 0.723 0.039 0.636
tra black15 0.044 0.363 0.038 0.430 0.243 0.016 0.255 0.011




















































Exhibit 6  (continued)
MNL Regression Results of the Impact of Neighborhood Subprime Lending (Home Purchase in 2005)
2001–2003 Sample 2004–2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
90-day Foreclosure 90-day Foreclosure
Risk Variable Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
u rate 0.069 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.160 0.000
p sub 2005 0.232 0.035 0.224 0.041 0.210 0.365 0.205 0.373
y2001(y2004) 0.516 0.000 0.518 0.000 0.756 0.000 0.740 0.000
y2002(y2005) 0.371 0.000 0.366 0.000 0.565 0.000 0.544 0.000
cons 9.420 0.000 9.443 0.000 7.963 0.000 7.624 0.000
Note: N  314,833 loan months of 10,094 loans for the 2001–2003 sample and 189,462 loan months of 6,986 loans for the 2004–2006 sample. The





























Exhibit 7  MNL Regression Results of the Impact of Neighborhood Subprime Lending (Reﬁnance in 2005)
2001–2003 Sample 2004–2006
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
90-day Foreclosure 90-day Foreclosure
Risk Variable Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Delinquent reﬁ 0.070 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.030 0.001 0.017 0.236
put 0.032 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.072 0.000
cred620 0.936 0.000 0.152 0.502 1.987 0.000 1.681 0.000
cred660 0.709 0.000 0.009 0.961 1.339 0.000 1.145 0.000
cred720 0.340 0.007 0.193 0.254 0.626 0.000 0.447 0.076
dti miss 1.180 0.000 1.765 0.000 0.472 0.064 0.530 0.257
dti36 0.443 0.004 0.483 0.040 0.379 0.021 0.445 0.132
dti42 0.391 0.012 0.243 0.311 0.355 0.032 0.389 0.189
dti100 0.258 0.151 0.173 0.536 0.523 0.002 0.696 0.017
af american 0.007 0.961 0.714 0.006 0.152 0.214 0.547 0.030
hispanic 0.253 0.049 0.308 0.079 0.204 0.180 0.320 0.177
lupb 0.406 0.001 0.354 0.064 0.189 0.066 0.004 0.984
loanage 1.274 0.000 2.235 0.000 0.972 0.000 1.604 0.000
tra inc80 0.050 0.780 0.141 0.589 0.155 0.338 0.496 0.096
tra inc120 0.031 0.827 0.109 0.600 0.225 0.097 0.647 0.013
tra black15 0.118 0.363 0.099 0.627 0.260 0.069 0.394 0.134
tra black30 0.079 0.567 0.284 0.162 0.146 0.278 0.099 0.675
u rate 0.081 0.042 0.134 0.033 0.083 0.018 0.064 0.300
r sub 2005 0.852 0.027 1.931 0.001 0.617 0.114 0.771 0.250
y2001(y2004) 1.446 0.000 2.072 0.000 0.604 0.000 0.187 0.430
y2002(y2005) 0.904 0.000 1.191 0.000 0.343 0.004 0.015 0.946




















































Exhibit 7  (continued)
MNL Regression Results of the Impact of Neighborhood Subprime Lending (Reﬁnance in 2005)
2001–2003 Sample 2004–2006
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
90-day Foreclosure 90-day Foreclosure
Risk Variable Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Prepayment reﬁ 0.056 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.052 0.000
put 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.022 0.000
cred620 0.183 0.004 0.185 0.003 0.147 0.210 0.172 0.133
cred660 0.131 0.004 0.140 0.002 0.036 0.680 0.038 0.655
cred720 0.109 0.005 0.111 0.004 0.000 0.998 0.004 0.959
dti miss 0.279 0.001 0.286 0.001 0.078 0.584 0.082 0.561
dti36 0.043 0.389 0.050 0.317 0.325 0.003 0.310 0.004
dti42 0.136 0.007 0.137 0.007 0.258 0.016 0.247 0.020
dti100 0.077 0.174 0.080 0.156 0.168 0.132 0.144 0.190
af american 0.459 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.504 0.000
hispanic 0.113 0.006 0.112 0.006 0.152 0.221 0.162 0.192
lupb 0.494 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.169 0.076 0.140 0.130
loanage 0.415 0.000 0.428 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.249 0.000
tra inc80 0.055 0.330 0.060 0.278 0.122 0.253 0.153 0.149
tra inc120 0.069 0.132 0.077 0.096 0.018 0.830 0.025 0.764
tra black15 0.057 0.230 0.051 0.281 0.237 0.019 0.247 0.013





























Exhibit 7  (continued)
MNL Regression Results of the Impact of Neighborhood Subprime Lending (Reﬁnance in 2005)
2001–2003 Sample 2004–2006
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
90-day Foreclosure 90-day Foreclosure
Risk Variable Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
u rate 0.063 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.160 0.000
r sub 2005 0.315 0.035 0.315 0.033 0.432 0.154 0.468 0.119
y2001(y2004) 0.518 0.000 0.520 0.000 0.754 0.000 0.738 0.000
y2002(y2005) 0.375 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.544 0.000
cons 9.192 0.000 9.210 0.000 7.614 0.000 7.254 0.000
Note: N  314,833 loan months of 10,094 loans for the 2001–2003 sample and 189,462 loan months of 6,986 loans for the 2004–2006 sample. The




















































Exhibit 8  MNL Regression Results of the Impact of Neighborhood Subprime Lending (2006)
2001–2003 2004–2006
90-day Foreclosure 90-day Foreclosure
Risk Variable Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Default p sub 2006 1.001 0.002 1.783 0.000 0.649 0.025 1.020 0.050
Prepay p sub 2006 0.448 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.199 0.369 0.220 0.330
Default r sub 2006 0.877 0.020 1.651 0.002 0.979 0.011 0.719 0.275
Prepay r sub 2006 0.393 0.008 0.401 0.006 0.523 0.064 0.528 0.060
Note: The results of other variables are similar to those in Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7 so they are omitted in this table.364  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
same regression models are run for both the 2001–2003 (old originations) and the
2004–2006 (recent originations) cohorts. Since the qualitative results for all other
variables do not change when the 2006 subprime lending measures are used,
Exhibit 8 only lists the results for the subprime lending variables. A positive
coefﬁcient means that the odds of the particular outcome rather than the reference
group (Active) increase as the independent variable increases; a negative
coefﬁcient means the odds decrease. Exhibits 9 and 10 provide the results of the
two-stage model using the MTM data.
The results from the MNL model indicate that subprime purchase lending is
signiﬁcantly (at the 0.05 level) and positively associated with the default risk
(Exhibit 6). This result is consistent when different measures of default (either
measured by 90-day delinquency or default) are used and when data of old and
recent originations are employed. A higher level of subprime purchase lending in
a neighborhood increases the probability of serious delinquency and default for
CAP loans. As Exhibit 11 shows, for an average borrower holding a CAP loan
originated in 2003, the conditional probability of default increases with the share
of subprime purchase loans in tracts where the property is located. Other things
being equal, if the borrower lives in a tract with 25% subprime purchase loans in
2005 (the national average share), the predicted probability of default is 0.11% at
48 months after origination. However, if the person lives in a tract with a higher
level of subprime purchase activities, for example, 50% in 2005, the predicted
probability of default would be 0.16%. In other words, other things equal, the
predicted probability of default for a borrower living in a tract with relatively
higher level of subprime purchase lending (50% in 2005) would be 42% higher
than for the borrower living in an average tract. For more recent originations, the
predicted probability of default for a borrower living in a tract with a higher level
of subprime purchase lending would be 34% higher than for a similar borrower
living in an average tract (Exhibit 12).
There is also consistent evidence that the share of subprime reﬁnancing mortgages
is negatively associated with the probability of default for old originations (Exhibit
6). For recent originations, the share of subprime reﬁnancing mortgages is
generally insigniﬁcant (only signiﬁcant in Exhibit 8), but the signs of the
coefﬁcients are consistent. As Exhibit 11 shows, the predicted probability of
default for a CAP loan originated in 2003 in a tract with a higher level of subprime
reﬁnance activities would be 62% higher than for the borrower living in an average
tract. One possible explanation for the signiﬁcant and larger negative impact of
subprime reﬁnance lending on old originations is that subprime lenders have
directed their attention at borrowers with some equity in their houses in more
well-established neighborhoods.
Generally, the share of subprime reﬁnance mortgages is signiﬁcantly and
negatively associated with the risk of prepayment (except the insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcients for Models 7 and 8 in Exhibit 7). One possible explanation is that the
higher level of subprime reﬁnancing activities may reﬂect a lack of access to prime
or FHA activities. In some neighborhoods with previous concentrated subprimeNeighborhood Subprime Lending  365
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Exhibit 9  Estimates of Two-Stage Probit Model
(Volatility of Neighborhood House Price Change)
Home Purchase Reﬁnance
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
default cred620 1.125 0.000 cred620 1.124 0.000
cred660 0.864 0.000 cred660 0.863 0.000
cred720 0.421 0.000 cred720 0.421 0.000
dti miss 0.010 0.947 dti miss 0.004 0.976
dti36 0.015 0.850 dti36 0.015 0.849
dti42 0.049 0.502 dti42 0.049 0.497
ltv95 0.441 0.047 ltv95 0.441 0.049
ltv97 0.235 0.346 ltv97 0.235 0.350
ltv100 0.571 0.005 ltv100 0.570 0.005
ltv120 0.682 0.001 ltv120 0.682 0.001
af american 0.165 0.081 af american 0.167 0.077
hispanic 0.037 0.778 hispanic 0.038 0.771
lupb 0.198 0.007 lupb 0.197 0.007
tra inc80 0.205 0.083 tra inc80 0.211 0.076
tra inc120 0.248 0.012 tra inc120 0.252 0.011
tra black15 0.258 0.012 tra black15 0.259 0.012
tra black30 0.061 0.528 tra black30 0.059 0.538
y2004 0.013 0.937 y2004 0.010 0.952
y2005 0.073 0.668 y2005 0.076 0.654
I volatility 0.119 0.002 I volitality 0.113 0.005
cons 0.865 0.313 cons 0.867 0.312
volatility p sub 2005 2.195 0.000 r sub 2005 2.299 0.000
vol msa 0.445 0.000 vol msa 0.455 0.000
pi 2004 0.008 0.046 pi 2004 0.017 0.000
pi 0405 3.973 0.003 pi 0405 4.734 0.000
pi 0506 5.959 0.000 pi 0506 4.112 0.002
unemp 2006 0.232 0.000 unemp 2006 0.257 0.000
unemp 0506 0.332 0.000 unemp 0506 0.283 0.000
unemp 0607 0.982 0.000 unemp 0607 0.953 0.000
unemp 0708 0.281 0.000 unemp 0708 0.295 0.000
I default 0.087 0.122 I default 0.111 0.053
cons 0.489 0.076 cons 1.024 0.000
Notes: N  4,379. volitality represents the price volatility (the standard deviation) during the ﬁrst
quarter 2006 to the ﬁrst quarter 2008. I default and I volatility are estimated values from the
ﬁrst-stage regressions. Results for the ﬁrst-stage regression not listed here.366  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
Exhibit 10  Estimates of Two-Stage Probit Model
(Neighborhood House Price Change)
Home Purchase Reﬁnance
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
default cred620 1.144 0.000 cred620 1.143 0.000
cred660 0.815 0.000 cred660 0.815 0.000
cred720 0.400 0.000 cred720 0.400 0.000
dti miss 0.003 0.984 dti miss 0.001 0.993
dti36 0.012 0.867 dti36 0.011 0.881
dti42 0.054 0.438 dti42 0.053 0.440
ltv95 0.356 0.097 ltv95 0.361 0.095
ltv97 0.321 0.175 ltv97 0.326 0.173
ltv100 0.545 0.005 ltv100 0.550 0.005
ltv120 0.652 0.001 ltv120 0.658 0.001
af american 0.142 0.119 af american 0.146 0.109
hispanic 0.074 0.556 hispanic 0.072 0.565
lupb 0.264 0.000 lupb 0.263 0.000
tra inc80 0.196 0.065 tra inc80 0.198 0.062
tra inc120 0.192 0.034 tra inc120 0.195 0.032
tra black15 0.143 0.153 tra black15 0.145 0.150
tra black30 0.025 0.786 tra black30 0.026 0.782
y2004 0.002 0.986 y2004 0.002 0.984
y2005 0.066 0.483 y2005 0.067 0.478
I appre mtm 3.105 0.000 I appre mtm 3.047 0.000
cons 3.317 0.005 cons 3.236 0.007
appre mtm p sub 2005 0.082 0.000 r sub 2005 0.042 0.000
vol msa 0.012 0.000 vol msa 0.012 0.000
pi 2004 0.003 0.000 pi 2004 0.004 0.000
pi 0405 0.340 0.000 pi 0405 0.406 0.000
pi 0506 0.624 0.000 pi 0506 0.700 0.000
unemp 2006 0.014 0.000 unemp 2006 0.016 0.000
unemp 0506 0.025 0.000 unemp 0506 0.022 0.000
unemp 0607 0.053 0.000 unemp 0607 0.051 0.000
unemp 0708 0.028 0.000 unemp 0708 0.028 0.000
I default 0.017 0.076 I default 0.015 0.020
cons 1.152 0.000 cons 1.154 0.000
Notes: N  4,379. appre mtm represents the neighborhood house price change during the ﬁrst
quarter 2006 to the ﬁrst quarter 2008. I default and I appre mtm are estimated values from the
ﬁrst-stage regressions. Results for the ﬁrst-stage regression not listed here.Neighborhood Subprime Lending  367
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Note: Based on Model 2 in Exhibit 6 for the 2001–2003 sample. The predicted conditional probability is as
of 48 months after origination for a borrower holding a CAP loan originated in 2003, with the mean value of
other regressors.
activities, borrowers may ﬁnd themselves without access to credit with favorable
terms. The results are consistent for both old originations: the level of subprime
lending not only impacts the performance of recent originations but also that of
old outstanding CAP mortgages.
Results of the Two-stage Model
Parameter estimates of the default and housing price change equation with the
endogenous variables using the MTM property value data are presented in Exhibit
9 (volatility) and Exhibit 10 (neighborhood housing price appreciation). Results
suggest the endogenous housing price change variable is a signiﬁcant predictor of
the default behavior of CAP loans but the endogenous default variable is generally
insigniﬁcant and the only one signiﬁcant one has a sign different from the
hypothesis. It is likely that many of these defaulted CAP (90days) loans did not
end up in foreclosure so their impact on housing price change had been
insigniﬁcant. It is also possible that the impact of the default of CAP loans on368  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
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neighborhood house price has been marginal since there has been no signiﬁcant
concentration of CAP loans.
The results suggest that subprime purchase lending activities signiﬁcantly reduce
the neighborhood house price appreciation and increase the house price volatility.
For a 1% increase in the share of subprime home purchase originations in the
neighborhood in 2005, the house price declines by 0.08% and the price volatility
measured by the standard deviation of the housing price index during the study
period increases by 2.2%. Considering the fact that most CAP loans are very
sensitive to house price changes because of their very high loan-to-values, the
house price changes due to the concentration of subprime lending will inevitably
inﬂuence the performance of CAP loans.
The CAP loan default model conﬁrms that the deterioration in neighborhood
property values signiﬁcantly increases the default risk of CAP loans. Based on
the results in the second stage of regression, the house price appreciationNeighborhood Subprime Lending  369
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other regressors.
signiﬁcantly reduced the default risk of CAP loans (with an odds ratio of 0.04).
The house price volatility also signiﬁcantly increases the default risk of CAP loans
(with an odds ratio of 1.13). The results are robust when different house price
measures and different measures of subprime activities at the tract level are used
including the share of purchase subprime originations in 2005.11 The only
exception is that the share of subprime reﬁnance lending in 2005 has an
insigniﬁcant impact on the neighborhood house price appreciation but it does
increases the house price volatility. This is somewhat consistent with the results
from the MNL regression that the reﬁnance subprime activities only have a
marginal impact on the performance of recently originated CAP loans.
Several of the variables that reﬂect local economic conditions were also associated
with the change in property values between 2006 and 2008. As expected, the
unemployment rate in 2006 and the subsequent increase in unemployment rate
signiﬁcantly increase the house price volatility and are also signiﬁcantly and
negatively associated with the house price appreciation. The per capital personal
income in 2004 and the subsequent change cause a higher level of house price370  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
volatility but are negatively associated with the house price appreciation. It seems
both the unemployment and income level and shocks increases volatility. But the
most recent changes in the level of income per-capita (from 2005 to 2006, pi
0506) is positively associated with the house price appreciation. The results are
generally consistent with Mian and Suﬁ’s (2008) ﬁnding that the rapid
development of nonprime loans in areas with very high denial rates previously
was an important factor in the price bubble and the subsequent concentration of
foreclosures. Very likely these previously underserved neighborhoods had a lower
income and a high unemployment rate before the housing boom.
The results from the 2SPLS model conﬁrm the negative relationship between
subprime lending and CAP loan performance from the MNL model. Furthermore,
it supports the hypothesis that one mechanism of the impact of the concentrated
subprime lending is by lowering the neighborhood property value or increasing
the house price volatility. The empirical results are consistent with the increasing
evidence in the literature that subprime loans have a much higher foreclosure rate
and that foreclosures lower the value of neighboring properties and impose
signiﬁcant costs on communities. Therefore, the negative spillover effects from
the concentrated subprime lending contribute to the increased default risk of
CAP loans and one important mechanism is its negative spillover effect on
neighborhood property values.
Results of Other Controls
As noted previously, many variables other than subprime lending may inﬂuence
the performance of residential mortgages. Here are some interpretations of some
important variables based primarily on results in Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7, since
the qualitative results of these variables do not change when different subprime
measures are used.
 Value of the Put Option: Borrowers with less or negative equity in their
homes (larger value of put) are more likely to default and less likely to
prepay. The results conﬁrm the common wisdom that the level of equity
in a home is a strong predictor for prepayment and default.
 Value of the Call Option: The call option (call), which measures the
saving from reﬁnancing in the prime market, has a signiﬁcant effect on
the outcome of both prepayment and default. The results conﬁrm that if
the call option is ‘‘in the money,’’ borrowers are more likely to prepay
their mortgages. The value of the call option is also positively associated
with the probability of default. This may be explained by the fact that
many borrowers have greater values of the call option primarily because
mortgage note rates are higher. Since a higher note rate may be regarded
as a measure of credit risk, so borrowers whose mortgages have higher
note rates may be more likely to default on their mortgages.
 Credit History: Generally, borrowers with lower credit scores are more
likely to experience serious delinquency and default and less likely to
prepay.Neighborhood Subprime Lending  371
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 DTI: Borrowers with higher debt ratios are more likely to experience
serious delinquencies and less likely to prepay. But borrowers with higher
DTI ratios are not necessarily more likely to end up in default.
 Borrower Race: African Americans are signiﬁcantly less likely to prepay
but not signiﬁcantly different in their delinquency probability and even
less likely to end up with foreclosure. For Hispanics, the coefﬁcients for
both default and prepayment are insigniﬁcant.
 Neighborhood Controls: Greater black representation in neighborhoods
(tracts) appears to have no statistically signiﬁcant impact on both default
and prepayment. Neighborhood median income level does not have
signiﬁcant impact on prepayment. Income level of neighborhood is
generally insigniﬁcant (with one exception of borrowers in the median-
income neighborhoods for the outcome of default). Generally, the results
suggest there is no consistent evidence that racial composition and
income of the neighborhood matter in individual default behavior.12
 Unemployment Rate: County unemployment rate is negatively
associated with probability of prepayment in all models and positively
associated with the probability of delinquency for recent originations. But
for old originations, county unemployment rate is negatively associated
with the probability of delinquency and default, which may be explained
by some locational information not fully captured by the model.
 Time Dummies: Older originations are less likely to experience default
and more likely to prepay according to the MNL model.
 Conclusions and Implications
The subprime crisis has signiﬁcant consequences on the entire housing market
and the overall economy. The impact of the subprime crisis was examined by
focusing on its spillover effect on a segment of community reinvestment
mortgages serving LMI borrowers. This study ﬁnds that the neighborhood
subprime lending level, as measured by the share of subprime purchase or
reﬁnance loans, is positively associated with the probability of default for the
borrowers holding CRA-type CAP loans in the same neighborhoods. The level of
subprime reﬁnance lending is also found to be negatively associated with the
probability of prepayment. While this study sample has some particular features,
this study shows how CRA-type borrowers suffer from the subprime mortgage
crisis.
There are some possible explanations for these relationships. One of the possible
transmission mechanisms through which the concentration of subprime lending
impacted the performance of CAP loans was identiﬁed. By employing a 2SPLS
model, the concentration of subprime lending and the resulting clusters of
foreclosed properties in certain neighborhoods was found to reduce property
values and increases volatility. The lowered neighborhood property values increase372  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
the default probability of borrowers holding any loan products, including CAP
loans. The results suggest that the negative spillover effect from the spatial
concentration of subprime lending contributes, at least partially, to the increased
default risk of CAP mortgages. By showing that previous subprime activities have
affected the behavior of other homeowners, the results suggest that in weaker
neighborhoods where subprime loans and foreclosures are concentrated,
borrowers, no matter what kind of products they have, may have fewer resources
and opportunities and may be more vulnerable to default.
The results also suggest that the level of subprime activities can serve as a measure
of neighborhood risk in the current housing market and can point to previous
loose underwriting, rising subprime foreclosures, or falling neighborhood house
prices. Using the share of subprime purchase or reﬁnance loans in each census
tract, based on readily available HMDA data, researchers and policymakers can
roughly track local lending activities, identify potential hot spots, and better target
intervention efforts, such as foreclosure prevention counseling or other services.
Although private lenders are originating few subprime loans at any terms now,
the spatial concentration of risky loan products should be monitored more closely.
Future research would also beneﬁt from identifying threshold effects of the impact
of subprime lending and other risky loan products; this could have important
policy implications.
 Endnotes
1 The Mortgage Banker Association reports that subprime loans in the second quarter of
2008 had a serious delinquency rate 7.6 times higher than that for prime loans (17.9 vs.
2.35). In addition, subprime mortgages represent 48% of the newly started foreclosures
while they only represent 12% of the loans outstanding (MBA, 2008).
2 Since the ﬁrst quarter of 2005, the foreclosure start rates for prime ARMs increased
from 0.17% to 1.06% in the fourth quarter of 2007 and the foreclosure starts rate for
prime ﬁxed loans increased from 0.15% to 0.22% (MBA, 2008).
3 Based on data from the Loan Performance, Cutts and Merrill (2008) estimate that the
share of loans in the subprime segment with limited or no income or asset documentation
grew from less than 30% in 2001 to over 50% by 2006 while in the Alt-A segment
these loans increased to over 80%.
4 The term ‘‘Nonprime’’ includes both loans to borrowers with weak credit histories, as
well as what have come to be called ‘‘A-,’’ ‘‘Alt-A,’’ and other loan types that fail to be
eligible for GSE purchase due to factors other than credit.
5 Some seriously delinquency loans were returned to original lenders based on the
‘‘limited indemnity’’ rule, which usually requires lenders to retain the main recourse on
loans until 12 consecutive on-time payments are made. For this study sample, the 186
returned loans are treated as defaults, although Self-Help could not track their
performance after they were returned to original lenders. This treatment may
overestimate the incidence of foreclosure, but all these loans had experienced serious
delinquencies (90day) and many of them should have ended up in foreclosure in theNeighborhood Subprime Lending  373
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current softening housing market although they would not cause further credit losses for
Self-Help.
6 Since the OFHEO house price index (HPI) at metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level
is available quarterly, it is assumed that each month in the same quarter has the same
appreciation rate. If the property is located in an area outside an MSA, state-level HPI
are used. Given the MSA house price index HPIi0 at origination and HPIit in month t,
the value of the put option for house i with an original purchase price Pi0 can be
calculated for each month, t:
(upb  P *( HPI /HPI )) it i0 it i0 put  . (2) it Pi0
7 Given the original balance (OBi), the term of the mortgage (TMi), and the interest rate
on the mortgage (Ri) for a ﬁxed rate mortgage i, the monthly payments can be calculated:
TMi (1  R) i PAY  R * OB . (3)  ii i TMi (1  R)  1 i
The future monthly payments (PAYi) are then discounted by the interest rate (Ri)a n d
prevailing interest rate (PRi) separately. The Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market
Survey (PMMS) is used to proxy for prevailing interest rates on prime, conventional,
and ﬁxed-rate mortgages:
TM TM ii PAY PAY ii PDC  PDC  . (4)  cit rit mm (1  R)( 1  PR) mtm t ii
The call option is deﬁned as the difference in the present values of the payment stream
at the mortgage note rate and the prevailing interest rate:
PDC  PDC rit cit call  . (5) it PDCrit
8 The variables selected should meet two requirements. First, conditional on the
troublesome regressor, the instruments must be uncorrelated with the outcome of interest.
The second requirement is that the instruments be correlated with the troublesome
regressors.
9 Except the MTM data, Fannie Mae also provides the RPS housing price data, which
incorporates information concerning property transaction, property characteristics, and
property tax. Because this additional information arrives sporadically, it has more
volatility in individual RPS house price than in individual MTM records.374  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
10 Since the per capita income data is still unavailable for the years after 2006, the 2004
data at the county level are used as a proxy for the neighborhood income level.
11 The same regressions were tried using RPS data and the 2006 subprime lending
variables. The results are quite consistent with those in Exhibit 9 and 10. The results
are available upon request.
12 Of course, there is a potential multicollinearity among the neighborhood subprime
lending variable and other neighborhood characteristics measure. However, even after
the subprime lending variables were dropped, the neighborhood characteristics measures
are still insigniﬁcant.
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